AFI 2024: ANALYSIS

I.

Introduction

The Analysis Section of the App Freedom Index (AFI) offers a detailed examination of global app availability in Apple’s App Store, evaluating 1,000 apps distributed across 10 critical categories. While app unavailability is often associated with censorship, it is crucial to recognize that regions also contend with non-political limitations such as infrastructural constraints, linguistic barriers, economic realities, and cultural preferences. These factors shape developers’ incentives to release apps in specific markets, resulting in unintentional or region-specific restrictions.

This multi-layered complexity highlights that app unavailability is frequently driven by a combination of deliberate suppression, economic factors, and technological limitations. By observing the disparities between open and restrictive digital ecosystems, the AFI analysis raises important questions for further exploration:

How do authoritarian regimes manipulate digital tools to consolidate control?
What challenges do developing nations face due to infrastructural and economic limitations?
How do advanced economies balance free expression with increasing regulatory oversight?

These questions emerge from the observed patterns of app unavailability, providing a foundation for deeper inquiry into the diverse factors shaping the global digital landscape.

As a pioneering study, the AFI methodology delivers significant insights but comes with notable limitations:

Curated Sample Bias: The reliance on 1,000 curated apps, while focused on sensitive categories, may overlook localized trends, silent removals, market-specific absences, or apps voluntarily withdrawn due to regulatory or economic hurdles.
Complex Attribution of Unavailability: Differentiating deliberate censorship from infrastructural deficiencies remains challenging, particularly in conflict-prone or low-income regions where multiple intersecting factors influence app accessibility.
Discrepancy Between Metrics: Focused app tests and broader unavailability metrics, such as those from the App Store Monitor (ASM) on AppleCensorship.com, underscore the need for ongoing methodological refinements to accurately capture both targeted censorship and systemic restrictions.

Despite these limitations, the AFI offers a dynamic snapshot of app availability, raising critical questions about the evolving digital landscape. By uncovering app unavailability patterns and their underlying causes, the analysis lays the groundwork for future research, advocacy, and policy reforms aimed at fostering a more transparent, inclusive, and open digital ecosystem.

II.

Curated 1000 Apps Availability Test Results

A. General Observations

When building and curating the 10 lists of 100 apps, our primary assumption was that apps related to sensitive categories—such as political or religious content, tools offering VPN, proxy, and encryption functionalities, and apps aimed at specific audiences (e.g., minorities, LGBTQ+, activists, and human rights defenders)—would face higher restrictions. This assumption was informed by findings from past studies on app availability, such as:

LGBTQ+ apps globally (2021),
Religion-related apps in China (2023), and
VPN apps in Russia (2024).

Contrary to our expectations, the results did not show a significantly higher rate of unavailability for these curated apps across most App Stores. Data collected by the App Store Monitor on AppleCensorship.com already enables us to calculate an “unavailability rate”, which reflects the percentage of unavailable apps compared to the total tested in a specific App Store. Key observations include:

The majority of App Stores have unavailability rates ranging between 10% and 16%, with most clustering between 10% and 13%.
The curated sample of 1,000 apps produced a global average unavailability rate of 12%, aligning closely with broader availability data.
In fact, many App Stores performed better on the curated sample compared to the broader unavailability rates reported by AppleCensorship.com.

Exceptions include Afghanistan, China, South Korea, Russia, and a few others, where unavailability rates for the 1,000 curated apps are notably similar or higher than the overall App Store averages.

Two primary factors help explain these results:

Curation Method Limitations
- The curation process—limiting each category to 100 apps and focusing on widely popular apps (typically with English as the primary or sole language)—reduces the likelihood of identifying higher unavailability rates.
- This contrasts with our past studies, where a broader selection revealed higher unavailability. For instance:
  - 150+ LGBTQ+ apps and religion-related apps were initially tested before identifying significant unavailability.
  - In Russia, over 350 VPN apps were tested, ultimately pinpointing approximately 100 unavailable apps.
These findings suggest that lower unavailability rates in specific App Stores reflect the curated nature of the test rather than the true scale of restrictions in that region.
Impact of “Regional Apps”

The unavailability rates reported on AppleCensorship.com include regional apps—those released exclusively in a few App Stores due to local relevance, language, copyright, or economic considerations (e.g., a food delivery app specific to one region).
Such apps inflate unavailability rates but do not represent undue restrictions or censorship.
During curation, regional apps were largely excluded and replaced with alternatives showing broader availability, contributing to the observed discrepancy.

While the results do not reveal a systematic increase in app unavailability across most App Stores, they remain consistent with broader data from AppleCensorship.com, where the majority of App Stores have had more than 6,000 apps tested for availability. The findings underscore that observed unavailability rates are strongly influenced by the nature and scope of the curated sample, rather than a definitive measure of digital restrictions.

B. Geographic Trends

1. High Restriction Regions

China (406), Russia (199), Afghanistan (197), Belarus (107), Iraq (105), Nigeria (99), Morocco (99), Ghana (90), DRC (81), Myanmar (84), Saudi Arabia (75)

These countries with a significantly high number of app unavailability have two things in common – political instability or autocratic governments and international sanctions. In cases like Belarus and Russia, the government exercises strict oversight and restricts access to apps for communication, human rights, and political expression. In Afghanistan, weak governance and conflict-driven policies impede access and market unavailability. It is worth noting that international sanctions may have caused app developers/publishers to remove their app from the App Stores in order to comply with sanctions related regulations and requirements.
The high app unavailability in China (408) and Russia (201) reflects their authoritarian political systems, where regulatory frameworks are heavily intertwined with state control over information. In China, the “Great Firewall” enforces censorship under the guise of “cyber sovereignty,” while Russia’s Sovereign Internet Law centralizes internet control, targeting apps that challenge state ideologies or facilitate dissent
Afghanistan (197), Ghana (90), Nigeria (99), Morocco (99), Saudi Arabia (76), Myanmar (84): Economic disparities and weak infrastructure cause limited app availability. However, cultural taboos and legal restrictions (e.g., for LGBTQ+ apps in Ghana) also play a role. For instance, internet freedom is relatively better in Ghana compared to more authoritarian states. Similarly, in countries like Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, app categories like LGBTQ+ and digital privacy are heavily restricted, reflecting the intertwining of religious orthodoxy with governance.

2. Freer Ecosystems with Low Restrictions

Canada (10), United States (13), Australia (17), United Kingdom (20), New Zealand (19), Iceland (33)

Canada (10), the United States (13), United Kingdom (20), and Western Europe have low app restrictions, because of their open-market economies and adherence to comparatively more democratic principles of free expression. However, this trend could also be attributed to higher accountability mechanisms for tech companies and a stronger civil society pushback against censorship.
Smaller progressive nations like New Zealand (19) and Iceland (33) align with liberal trends, reflecting their progressive socio-political systems and minimal security threats that might otherwise justify censorship.

C. Category-wise Trends

1. LGBTQ+ (2482 instances of unavailability)

The unavailability of LGBTQ+ apps reflects cultural and legal stigmatization in conservative societies. The high restrictions in this category highlight the clash between cultural conservatism and international human rights norms.
The unavailability of LGBTQ+ apps (2482 instances of unavailability globally) represents an important intersection of culture, law, and international human rights obligations. However, this category does not uniformly correlate with legal prohibitions. For example, in India (14), LGBTQ+ rights have seen legal progress towards decriminalization, the number of unavailable apps may suggest cultural barriers and lack of social acceptance and the reluctance of platforms to operate freely, rather than sanctions or laws against it. Thus, LGBTQ+ app restrictions may not be limited to explicitly anti-LGBTQ+ laws but also to environments where societal stigma and lack of corporate commitment inhibit app accessibility.
Countries like Afghanistan (67) and Russia (49) enforce anti-LGBTQ+ laws, which results in the unavailability of apps that promote inclusivity or provide safe spaces for marginalized communities.
Countries with high unavailability of LGBTQ+ apps, such as Ghana (40), Iraq (33), Kenya (32), Libya (33), have either homosexuality criminalized or enforced cultural taboos, leading to the banning of apps that promote LGBTQ+ rights or community support.
Similarly, Nigeria (44) and Morocco (34) have heavy penalties for LGBTQ+ advocacy.

2. Human Rights & Civil Society (1123 instances of unavailability)

Human rights apps being unavailable often reflects political hostility toward dissent and government mistrust of civil society.

Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy (0): These democracies allow unrestricted access to the 100 selected human rights apps, indicating strong internet freedom.
Russia (12), Tajikistan (10), Pakistan (9), Afghanistan (12): Governments in these countries perceive human rights apps as tools for exposing corruption or organizing protests, leading to bans or unavailability. Unavailability in Russia, in particular, includes apps associated with democratic movements.
The heavy unavailability of apps in this category may be reflective of the direct impact of authoritarian governance. In Afghanistan (12), China (11) and Russia (12), the content of the unavailable apps is seen as a threat to state control and surveillance.
African and Middle Eastern nations, including Nigeria (8) and Libya (8) exhibit similar trends, suggesting a diffusion of authoritarian digital policies.

3. VPN (532 instances of unavailability)

VPN apps are direct targets for governments aiming to suppress dissent and control information. The absolute restriction in China (100) and high unavailability in Russia (54) highlight their efforts to curtail tools that enable bypassing censorship, underscoring these countries’ prioritization of surveillance over individual privacy rights.
Likewise, censoring of VPNs in India (10) and Belarus (14) notably stem from concerns over terrorism, national security and combating “fake news.

4. News & Media (285 instances of unavailability)

State-controlled media environments, like China (20) and Afghanistan (15), show a significant clampdown on apps that provide independent news. These restrictions are often part of a larger strategy to suppress dissenting narratives and maintain regime stability.
Conversely, most of the countries show unrestricted access with minimal restrictions in place and no significant trend can be deciphered.

5. Religion (382 instances of unavailability)

App restrictions in this category are deeply tied to socio-religious dynamics. Except China (53) which restricts apps catering to minority religions like Christianity and Islam, as they are often perceived as threats to “public order”, the apps under the category are significantly available. This is again not due to the inexistence of censorship policy but such apps are available because they are typically created for local specific religious or cultural communities, limiting their relevance and adoption beyond their intended demographic.
The unavailability of Bible Gateway in predominantly Christian countries could be linked to GDPR compliance which imposes significant compliance costs and privacy regulation hurdles rather than outright censorship per se.

6. Digital Security & Privacy (392 instances of unavailability)

Apps in this category face restrictions in high-surveillance states like China (26), Russia (14), Belarus (12), Turkey (4) and Myanmar (6), where governments actively monitor and control communication channels to suppress dissent. These trends are emblematic of broader efforts to dismantle digital privacy under the guise of national security.

Platforms that facilitate collective action or dissent are prime targets in autocratic regimes. In China (45), Russia (16) and Iraq (14), the unavailability of such apps reflects fears of social mobilization and regime instability.

8. Education & Public Health (531 instances of unavailability)

Education apps are typically less targeted for censorship, but more than censorship, their unavailability could be a result of several factors, like lack of government focus on education, conflict and war, and infrastructural limitations, such as unreliable internet access or insufficient digital devices.
In some cases, political challenges play a role, such as restrictions on foreign educational content perceived as ideologically incompatible, or broader policies that suppress access to education for specific groups, like girls under Taliban rule.
Unavailability may also result from apps being designed with hyperlocal contexts in mind, reflecting the level and nature of education, language preferences, and cultural nuances of the regions. Further, local economic factors, such as the inability of developers to localize content for underserved languages or low-income markets, further restrict their accessibility.

9. Communication (1347 instances of unavailability)

Blocking communication apps is a common tactic for controlling dissent and curbing freedom of expression.
Of all the regions tested, China (60) and Russia (21) are on the top. The number of unavailable apps in these stores reflects broader governmental policies of isolating citizens from external influences.
Nigeria (16), Belarus (14), Afghanistan (13): Nigeria and Afghanistan show intermittent bans during political unrest. In countries such as Qatar (7) and UAE (6), VoIP services like WhatsApp and Skype are restricted due to state regulations and monopolies over telecom revenues.

10. Miscellaneous (1175 instances of unavailability)

This category, added for methodological purposes, confirms the broad overreach of censorship regimes like China (36) and Afghanistan (27). The ambiguous justifications for these restrictions often obscure their intent, which is rooted in broader political control.

D. Most Unavailable Apps by Category

News & Media: The Economic Times, Google News, People’s Daily
VPNs and Proxy Services: Hola VPN, Norton VPN, F-Secure FREEDOME VPN
Religion: Bible Gateway, Yam Chel Torah, Scan Halal
Dating: Match Dating App, Bumble for Friends, Coffee meets Bagel, Hinge
Social Networking: TalkingParents, Nextdoor, Wizz App
Communication: Talkatone , Tam Tam Messenger, TextNow: Call + Text Unlimited
Digital Security & Privacy: Robikiller ( Anti Spam Calls) , G Data Mobile Security
Human Rights & Civil Society: Team Advocacy , GreenAct, holi: Social and Eco Impact
Education & Public Health: Mango Languages , FoodSwitch, Dexcom Diabetes Management
Miscellaneous: OverDrive: e-, Zalando, Snappy Fact

E. Anomalies

Ghana and Nigeria: In Ghana (90 unavailable apps) and Nigeria (99 unavailable apps), app restrictions appear to be selective rather than widespread. Unlike authoritarian states with pervasive digital controls, these developing nations lack the infrastructure for extensive censorship. Instead, their restrictions likely stem from socio-political insecurities, such as concerns over misinformation, cybercrime, or political dissent, particularly during sensitive periods like elections.
Vietnam: In Vietnam, 47 out of 1,000 curated apps were found unavailable, suggesting relatively low levels of app censorship. However, this result may be misleading. The absence or limited restrictions imposed by authorities could be better explained by the small iOS market size in the country and the limited adoption of specific apps rather than a reflection of genuine digital freedom. These factors likely reduce the need for overt government intervention, masking the true extent of digital control.
Afghanistan: The country’s selective enforcement of apps is perplexing. While the Taliban regime has imposed a blanket ban on most international media, LGBTQ+ and social media apps to control the influx of external news and ideologies, VPN and web protection apps remain relatively unregulated. This selective approach could reflect a complex interplay of intent and capacity. By allowing VPNs, the regime inadvertently enables citizens to bypass media restrictions, albeit on a limited scale. However, this leniency may stem from the technical challenges of monitoring VPN usage or a calculated strategy to appease international scrutiny without significantly loosening control. Furthermore, the continued availability of VPNs could also signify Afghanistan’s lack of comprehensive digital infrastructure to enforce broader internet censorship, a contrast to more technologically adept countries like China.

III.

Transparency Score Explanation

China’s exceptionally high number of average takedowns per year is a reflection of its pervasive and systemic broader censorship, which is rooted in its authoritarian governance. The high frequency of takedown requests in China relates to the removal of apps across categories and for several reasons including maintaining a tight control over information flow, apps accused of foreign influence, or which could help in social mobilization, and as a larger strategy to favour domestic apps over the foreign developed ones.
While, India’s (34) relatively high number of average takedowns per year shows a recent trend of selective and strategic app removal requests driven by specific concerns, motivated by geopolitics (removal of apps like Tik Tok and PubG, terror suspicion (Briar, Crypviser) and regulatory enforcement.
Similarly, South Korea’s moderate number of takedowns among democracies is likely tied to regulatory oversight. The state has been requesting to remove apps for their non-compliance with stringent data privacy laws and data sovereignty policies.
Norway’s score (13) can be perceived as a more regulatory-driven approach rather than outright censorship with takedown requests likely to be driven by GDPR-related issues, such as improper handling of user data.

IV.

Limitations of Current Methodology

1. Selection Bias

This analysis acknowledges several limitations. During our calculations, some initial observations pointed towards expected results, with countries such as China and Afghanistan performing poorly as anticipated due to their well-documented censorship practises and authoritarian regimes, while at the same time, some countries such as Latvia and Luxembourg performed surprisingly well in our curated app tests, despite scoring low on the AppleCensorhsip.com.
The discrepancies in app availability scores may stem from selection bias, as curated tests often prioritize sensitive or regional apps. The data also may not fully account for silent removals or voluntary app withdrawals. Future studies should aim for greater methodological alignment and transparency to address these gaps.
The ASM score is an availability rate derived from several thousand randomly selected apps in an app store. This significantly differs from the curated app test score, which is based on a smaller and more focused selection of 1000 apps.

2. Unavailability vs. Censorship

The unavailability of apps does not necessarily equate to deliberate or active censorship; it can also reflect technical, economic, or infrastructural constraints. In many developing nations, particularly those with limited digital infrastructure, app developers may choose not to release their products due to low market viability or lack of resources to adapt their platforms to local languages, devices, or internet standards.
Similarly, economic sanctions and geopolitical isolation can prevent companies from offering their apps in certain regions, as seen in countries like Iran and North Korea.
Some app restrictions arise from regulatory differences rather than outright suppression, where apps fail to meet local data storage, privacy, or content moderation requirements.
Unavailability may also be tied to technological gaps, such as inconsistent power supply or poor network coverage, which make widespread app functionality impractical, especially in rural or conflict-ridden areas. Thus, while app unavailability can sometimes indicate censorship, it often arises from a confluence of several factors– economic, regulatory, and infrastructural challenges that limit global digital integration.

V.

Conclusion

The 2024 App Freedom Index (AFI) is meant to measure the “freedom” and “openness” of App Stores beyond mere cases of targeted political censorship, showcasing both evolving strategies of broad digital control and the underlying systemic inequalities that contribute to app unavailability worldwide. Going beyond merely identifying patterns of censorship, the findings of the report makes an endeavour to explain how digital divide is perpetuated by the underlying structural and geopolitical realities. With a new set of learnings, the report challenges researchers, academicians and all of us to rethink our understanding and concept of digital freedom.

The 2024 AFI has its own sets of limitations of traditional metrics and assumptions in measuring digital accessibility for the apps. While our attempt to test the curated selection of 1,000 apps across ten sensitive categories has proven to effectively capture targeted forms of app restrictions, it also reveals a few blind spots as well.

These observations, however, do not suggest that curation is always inherently flawed, however, sometimes it requires consistent efforts of refinement and expansion that presents a holistic picture. Examples like Russia and China serve as a critical caveat for this report, highlighting how censorship can often be targeted and yet subtle to observe. Authorities may want to remove key apps which have significant utility or a greater symbolic value than enacting overarching bans. Such censorship strategies often give us a sense of freedom when in reality, effectively curtailing the access to the necessary tools. Thus, the future testings and methodologies need to incorporate these trends and be more inclusive to capture the scope of app unavailability in its whole.